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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shawn Kesling appeals contending the district court erred by granting the State's motion
to summarily dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief when there was a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, this Court
should reverse the order dismissing his petition and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, the State charged Mr. Kesling with six counts of forgery.
In each instance, expressly citing LC. § 18-3606, it alleged he had, "with the intent to defraud
another, make, and/or pass, and/or utter any fictitious bill, note, or check, purporting the bill,
note, or check in writing for the payment of money or property of some such bank account when
in fact, there is no such bank account in existence, knowing the same to be fictitious, to-wit:
[specific check number] from a fictitious Bluebird bank account .... " (Supp. R., pp.22-24.) 1
Mr. Kesling ultimately pled guilty to one of those charges and the State agreed to dismiss the
remainder. (See Supp. R., p.49.) The district court subsequently imposed a unified sentence of
fourteen years, with four years fixed. (R., p.92.) Mr. Kesling did not appeal from the judgment
of conviction. (R., p.9.)
However, Mr. Kesling did file a timely petition for post-conviction relief

(See

R., pp.8-12.) He was appointed counsel who filed an amended petition. (See R., p.92.) In that

1

While the district court did not formally rule on the State's motion for judicial notice of several
documents from the underlying criminal case (some of which were also attached to
Mr. Kesling's filings), the district court did quote from several of those documents in its decision
to summarily dismiss the petition. (See, e.g., R., p.92 (quoting from the information), pp.99-100
(quoting from the change of plea hearing transcript).) As such, it appears the district court
implicitly granted the State's motion for judicial notice.

1

amended petition, Mr. Kesling argued, inter alia, that trial counsel had been ineffective because
he had not conducted a sufficient investigation of the existence of the bank account in question.
(R., pp.21-22.) He also specifically alleged that, but for trial counsel's deficient performance in
this regard, he would have insisted on going to trial. (Supp. R., p.8.)
Specifically, Mr. Kesling alleged a sufficient investigation would have revealed that the
account listed on the checks actually did exist and that he had checking privileges with that bank
account through his account with American Express's Bluebird pre-paid card program.
(R., pp.20-21.) In support of those allegations, Mr. Kesling presented partial monthly statements
from his Bluebird accounts (account number ending -0680). 2 (See generally R., pp.54-89.)
Mr. Kesling also provided affidavits and records from records custodians for Harland Clarke
Holding Corp., the vendor which American Express used to print checks for its Bluebird account
holders. (Supp. R., pp.195-205.) One of the Harland Clarke custodians explained that Harland
Clarke has no contact with the actual Bluebird customer, nor do they have any banking or
financial records for that person. (Supp. R., p.196.) Rather, Harland Clarke only deals directly
with American Express and that, after American Express "validated" the Bluebird customer's
request for checks, American Express places the order for those checks with Harland Clarke
itself. (Supp. R., p.196; see Supp. R., pp.198-205 (copies of the validated order forms).)
The validated orders for checks in this case specifically directed Harland Clarke to
prepare checks on "ACCOUNT 72321927360075" for "CUSTOMER NAME Shawn M.
Kesling":

2

Attachment 5 to the amended petition contains a copy of the statement for Mr. Kesling' s
Bluebird account for the time he wrote the check which was the subject of the charge to which
ultimately pled guilty. (See R., pp.84-89; compare R., p.23.) However, it appears postconviction counsel failed to include page 5 of that statement in that filing. (See R., pp.88-89.)

2
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(E.g., Supp. R., p.198) The validated orders also instructed "Signature Lines: 1." (E.g., Supp.

R., p.198.) Harland Clarke prepared the checks as directed by American Express and sent them
to Mr. Kesling. (Supp. R., p.196.) The police officer's report also indicated that the account
number on those checks (-0075) was linked to a Wells Fargo bank account and the Wells Fargo
representative explained to the officer they were custodians of the funds and the accounts were
managed by American Express. (Supp. R., p.25.)
Despite this, the State argued there still was no evidence tying the account on the checks
to Mr. Kesling because there was nothing specifically tying Wells Fargo account -0075 to
Bluebird account -0680. (Supp. R., pp.153-54.) The State also argued that, even if counsel was
deficient for not investigating the actual existence of the bank accounts, Mr. Kesling could not
show prejudice because there was an alternative theory upon which his plea and conviction for
forgery could still potentially stand. (Supp. R., pp.155-62.)
Specifically, the State's prejudice argument centered on the fact that the checks at issue
had a section where the drafter was to write a "pre-authorization code" obtained from Bluebird.
(Supp. R., p.159.)

The State pointed out that, during interviews with police, Mr. Kesling

admitted that the codes he had entered on the checks at issue in this case were fictitious.
(Supp. R., p.59.) As such, the State contended Mr. Kesling's forgery conviction could be upheld
under LC. § 18-3601 for writing in fictitious pre-authorization codes. (Supp. R., p.160.) In

3

making that argument, the State admitted that the Information against Mr. Kesling's case only
spoke in terms of LC.§ 18-3606. (Supp. R., pp.160-61.) However, it argued that the charges
made under LC. § 18-3606 were sufficient to also charge Mr. Kesling under LC. § 18-3601.
(Supp. R., pp.160-61 (citing State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416 (1965)).)
Mr. Kesling replied that the State's argument was effectively based on an impermissible
variance because the conduct it was arguing for the alternative basis for the charge was not
included in the original charging document. (Supp. R., p.179.) Additionally, he argued that a
fictitious pre-authorization code was not a basis for a charge of forgery because it did not affect
the negotiability of the check.

(Supp. R., pp.179-80; see also Supp. R., p.117 n.1 (defense

counsel noting that Bluebird had waived unauthorized check fees in the past in Mr. Kesling's
case); R., p.88 (the Bluebird statement showing unauthorized check fees of $0.00); Supp.
R., p.25 (the police report noting that the initial report was that two of the seven checks

Mr. Kesling made out had, in fact, been paid).)

As such, defense counsel explained, even

considering the false pre-authorization code, Mr. Kesling still would not have pled to the charge,
and was, therefore, still prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance. (Supp. R., pp.17980.)
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. (See Supp. R., pp.107, 144.) The
district court ultimately denied Mr. Kesling's motion and granted the State's motion. (R., p.102.)
Specifically, it concluded that, despite the Harland Clarke affidavits, it could not find "that any
account linked to that account number [no. -0075] actually existed with funds that may or may
not have been available to Petitioner at the time he wrote the checks forming the basis of the
underlying charge." (R., p.101.) As such, it concluded Mr. Kesling had not shown deficient
performance. (R., pp.101-02.) Furthermore, while the district court noted it did not have to

4

reach the prejudice prong of the analysis, if it had, it agreed that, under Bishop, Mr. Kesling
would have still pied to the charges under LC. § 18-3606 based on a theory of guilt under
LC.§ 18-3601. (See R., p.102.) It also noted that several felony charges were dismissed under
the plea agreement. (R., pp.101-02.) Accordingly, the district court entered a final judgment
dismissing Mr. Kesling's petition. (R., p.104.) Mr. Kesling filed a notice of appeal timely from
the final judgment. (R., p.105.)
Mr. Kesling also filed a motion for reconsideration, in which he presented additional
evidence to show the connection between his Bluebird account and account -007 5 and to contest
the district court's ruling on the prejudice prong by arguing there was no evidence his trial
counsel had considered the alternative basis for the plea under Bishop.
R., pp.209-335.)

(See Supp.

He subsequently filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration which

included additional arguments against the decision to summarily dismiss his petition. (Aug.,
pp.1-3.)3
The district court determined Mr. Kesling's motion was properly considered under
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) and (b)(6).

(Aug., p.7.)

Under that rule, it concluded that none of

Mr. Kesling's additional evidence changed its determination that trial counsel had not provided
deficient performance. (Aug., pp.7-10.) It did not specifically discuss its alternative analysis on
the prejudice prong further. (See generally Aug.)

3

A motion to augment the record with Mr. Kesling's supplemental motion for reconsideration,
as well as the district court's ruling on his motion for reconsideration, has been filed
contemporaneously with this brief
5

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Kesling's petition for postconviction relief because there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Kesling's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Because There Was A Genuine Issue OfMaterial Fact With Regard To His Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A.

Standard Of Review
The Supreme Court has specifically addressed the standard of review that applies when

the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment:
Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the
same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from entering
summary judgment. However, the mere fact that both parties move for summary
judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must
evaluate each party's motion on its own merits.

Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9, _ , 454 P.3d 1092, 1101-02 (2019) (quoting Intermountain Forest
Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235 (2001)) (internal citations from
Intermountain Forest Mgmt. omitted); see also Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008)
(noting that, because post-conviction cases are civil in nature, the civil rules apply to them).
Thus, even when there are cross-motions for summary judgment, this Court should apply the
same standard it always has in reviewing whether the district court erred in granting a motion for
summary dismissal. Papin, 454 P.3d at 1101-02.
Summary dismissal presents a question of law which is subject to free review on appeal.

Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402 (2006). A petition for post-conviction relief may be
summarily dismissed only if it does not present a genuine issue of material fact. Baldwin, 145
Idaho at 153; see I.C. § 19-4906(b). When a genuine issue of material fact exists and would, if
resolved in the petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner for relief, the district court must conduct
anevidentiaryhearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at l53;Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517,518 (1998).

7

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is required to
accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true . . . ."

Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153;

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). Additionally, during the summary judgment

phase, the courts "liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) ("[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the

petitioner."). For purposes of this appeal, where the decision to grant the State's motion for
summary judgment is at issue, the State is the moving party. See Papin, 454 P.3d at 1102
(quoting Intermountain Forest Mgmt., 136 Idaho at 235). Therefore, the facts and reasonable
inferences are to be liberally construed in Mr. Kesling's favor. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792;
Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881.

To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's performance fell
below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by that deficient performance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850

(2004). In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when
he demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different, or, in other words, he must undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010).

In cases where, as here, the petitioner

alleges ineffective assistance relating to his decision to accept a plea offer, he must show "'there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial."' Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011) (quoting
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))).

8

The United States Supreme Court has observed that, in the context of an allegation that
trial counsel failed to sufficiently investigate the case, the determination of prejudice will likely
tum on whether the evidence that would have been discovered would have potentially changed
the outcome of the trial, such that trial counsel would have changed his recommendation to plead
guilty. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has since made it clear that the
focus in this regard is still on the defendant's state of mind in choosing to plead guilty. Booth,
151 Idaho at 622.

B.

There Was At Least A Genuine Issue Of Fact That Trial Counsel's Performance Was
Deficient Because A Sufficient Investigation Would Have Revealed A Factual Defense
To The Only Charged Conduct
The sufficiency of a trial attorney's investigation into a case is naturally guided by the

specific allegations against the defendant. See Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279-80 (1998)
(quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed.1982) ('"It is the duty of [defense counsel] to conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction."'). This means that trial
counsel cannot simply rest on the information already known to him when that evidence would
lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003);
accord Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.

374, 3 81-83 (2005), for the premise that "failure to investigate material relied upon by
prosecution was unreasonable").
The charges against Mr. Kesling expressly cited only LC. § 18-3606 as the basis for the
charges and identified the specific conduct being charged as - Mr. Kesling wrote checks on a
bank account when "there is no such bank account in existence, knowing the same to be

9

fictitious, to-wit: ... a fictitious Bluebird bank account." (Supp. R., pp.22-24.) Thus, the
clearly-relevant fact central to the charges made against Mr. Kesling, which the trial attorney
needed to have sufficiently investigated, was whether the checks were tied to an existing bank
account to which Mr. Kesling had valid checking privileges.
The evidence presented on post-conviction shows at least a genuine issue of material fact
that a sufficient investigation would have revealed evidence showing the account in question did,
in fact, exist and that Mr. Kesling had valid checking privileges with it. First, the evidence
shows that Mr. Kesling actually opened account -0680 with American Express's Bluebird
program.

(See R., pp.85-89 (statement for Mr. Kesling's Bluebird account, which had a

checking component).) Bluebird is one of several programs which is designed to help consumers
who are not adequately served by traditional banking procedures to meet their financial needs.
Colleen M. Svelnis, Banking Operations-Mobile Solutions Can Assist Underbanked
Consumers, Wolters Kluwer Banking and Finance Law Daily, 2013 WL 6842057 (Dec. 30,
2013). Primarily, these programs provide prepaid debit card services, but they also sometimes
provide "checking" services. 4 Id.
However, American Express specifically designed the Bluebird program as a "non-bank."
See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Network Branded Prepaid Cards, 65
Florida L. Rev. 1477, 1497 (September 2013). This means that American Express does not hold
the funds; rather, "when funds are deposited into a Bluebird account, American Express places
the funds into custodial accounts maintained at FDIC-insured banks."

4

Catherine Martin

Because of the design of these sort of programs, which is discussed infra, there is some
academic debate as to whether these instruments - "so-called 'Visa' or 'Mastercard' checks" are really "checks at all" under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), or whether they should
be analyzed pursuant to credit card rules instead. 2 UCC Transaction Guide, UCCTRANS
§ 12:6 (Aug. 2019 update).

Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in America?, 65 Cath. Univ. L. Rev.
221, 245 (2015). And, more often than not, the funds for such programs "are typically held in
pooled (not individual) accounts at banks or credit unions."

Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau, "Is the money on my prepaid card FDIC-insured?" updated Apr 1, 2019, available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/is-the-money-on-my-prepaid-card-fdic-insured-en529/ (last accessed Dec. 1, 2020). By doing this, the funds are protected by FDIC insurance
without American Express having to be an FDIC member. See Catharine Martin Christopher,
supra, at 245; accord Zywicki, 65 Florida L. Rev. at 1497 (explaining that programs such as

Bluebird are designed so that they are not subject to certain regulations, such that American
Express can operate the program with low fees for its customers and still tum a corporate profit).
Unfortunately, designing these programs in this fashion can cause problems for
subsequent legal analysis because, when this sort of program provides checking services, the
"drawer [of the check] is not a customer of the bank" where the funds are actually held. Peter A.
Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification of Payments Law, 53 Fordham L.
Rev. 83, 85 n.11 (1984). In other words, because of the way programs such as Bluebird are
designed, there will necessarily be two account numbers associated with any checking services
Bluebird offers - the customer's account number with Bluebird and the custodial bank account
number registered in Bluebird's name with the bank where the funds actually reside.
The evidence in this case indicates that is precisely what happened in Mr. Kesling's case.
Certainly, it shows a genuine issue of material fact that a sufficient investigation would have
revealed that to be the case.

As the police report explained, Wells Fargo representatives

informed the officer that the accounts on the check were "managed by American Express" and
Wells Fargo was the custodian of the funds. (Supp. R., p.25.) Moreover, the record custodian

11

from Harland Clarke explained that they received requests from American Express for Harland
Clarke to print checks on one of its "validated'' Bluebird accounts.
added).)

(Supp. R., p.196 (emphasis

Right at the top of American Express's order forms, it states:

"ACCOUNT

72321927360075" and "CUSTOMER NAME Shawn M. Kesling":
Hold Report Console
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(E.g., Supp. R., p.198.)

Furthermore, the validated order forms directed Harland Clarke to

prepare the checks with number -0075 as the routing number, and with one signature line,
personalized for Shawn M. Kesling. (E.g., Supp. R., p.198.)
As such, drawing all the reasonable inferences in Mr. Kesling's favor, as the applicable
standard requires, there was at least a genuine issue of material fact that a proper investigation by
trial counsel would have revealed that the bank account did, in fact, exist and that Mr. Kesling
had valid checking privileges on that account.

As such, trial counsel's performance was

deficient because a sufficient investigation would have revealed evidence which would have
factually disproved the only allegations actually made against Mr. Kesling. Compare Knutsen v.
State, 144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding deficient performance in failing to investigate

a potential witness whose testimony would have directly contradicted some of the State's

12

anticipated trial evidence). Accordingly, the district court's decision to dismiss Mr. Kesling's
petition on the first prong of the Strickland analysis was erroneous. 5

C.

There Was At Least A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That Mr. Kesling Would Not
Have Pled Guilty If Trial Counsel Had Conducted A Sufficient Investigation Which
Would Have Revealed A Factual Defense To The Only Basis For The Charges Actually
Articulated In The Charging Document
In this case, Mr. Kesling asserted that, but for trial counsel's failure to conduct a proper

investigation (which, as detailed supra, would have discovered evidence amounting to a factual
defense to the actual charges levied against him), he would not have pled guilty, but would have,
instead have insisted on going to trial. (See Supp. R., p.8.) The State's prejudice argument did
not really contradict his allegation in this regard. (See generally Supp. R., pp.155-62.) Rather, it
asserted, assuming the correctness of his arguments with respect to the actually-charged offense,
that he still would have pled guilty based on a yet-uncharged theory. (See Supp. R., pp.159-61.)
However, that argument is improper because it is built entirely on speculation that 1) the
State would have caught the error and realized it could have charged this case under a different
statute, 2) the district court would have allowed such an amendment, 3) defense counsel would
have done an adequate investigation into that new charge; and 4) Mr. Kesling would have
pleaded guilty to this amended charge. Since that argument is premised on such presumptions, it

5

In the district court's ruling, it also suggested it was finding no deficient performance because
there were no funds in the account to support the checks. (R., p.101.) However, the lack of
funds was not mentioned in the State's motion for summary judgment, nor did the district court
provide a notice of intent to dismiss on that basis. (See generally R., Supp. R.) Therefore, to the
extent the dismissal was based on that justification, the dismissal was erroneous because
LC.§ 19-4906(b) requires the petitioner be given notice of a flaw in his petition and the
opportunity to respond thereto before his petition can be summarily dismissed on such a basis.
See, e.g., Ridgely v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (reversing a decision to summarily dismiss
a petition when that decision was based on a consideration of which the petitioner did not have
notice).
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cannot be the basis for summary dismissal, when all reasonable inferences are to be run against
the moving party (in this instance, the State). E.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. In fact, as
discussed in depth infra, several of those presumptions are factually incorrect.
Nevertheless, the district court adopted the State's argument in that regard and concluded
Mr. Kesling was not prejudiced because he would still have pied guilty to those charges based on
a different theory than the one alleged. (R., p.102.) It based its decision in that regard on the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bishop, 89 Idaho 416 (1965). (R., p.102.)
For context, the relevant portion of the decision in Bishop turned on the Supreme Court's
understanding of two statutes, LC. § 18-3601 and LC. § 18-3606.6 Section 18-3601 provides, in
relevant part:
Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges or
counterfeits, any ... check ... ; or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as
true and genuine any of the above named false, altered, forged or counterfeited
matters, as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered,
forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person;
... is guilty of forgery.
I.C. § 18-3601. Section 18-3606 provides:
Every person who makes, passes, utters, or publishes, with intention to defraud
any other person, or who, with the like intention, attempts to pass, utter or
publish, or who has in his possession, with like intent to utter, pass, or publish,
any fictitious bill, note or check, purporting to be the bill, note, or check, or other
instrument in writing for the payment of money or property of some bank,
corporation, copartnership, or individual, when in fact, there is no such bank,

6

The other issue in Bishop dealt with was the district court's decision to admit an exhibit during
trial. Bishop, 89 Idaho at 422-23 (opinion of McFadden, J.). Justice McFadden wrote for a
unanimous court on that issue. See id. However, on the relevant issue, Justice Taylor wrote a
concurring and dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices McQuade, Smith, and Knudson.
Id. at 428. As such, Justice Taylor's opinion is the controlling opinion on the relevant issue.
However, it appears Justice Taylor concurred with Justice McFadden's recitation of the facts, as
his opinion provided only legal analysis. See generally id. at 426-28 (opinion of Taylor, J.).
Because of this, citations to Bishop will include the identifier "opinion of McFadden, J."
and "opinion of Taylor, J." as appropriate.
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corporation, copartnership, or individual in existence, knowing the bill, note,
check, or instrument in writing to be fictitious, is guilty of forgery and punishable
as provided by section 18-3604.
LC. § 18-3606. It appears those two statutes remain substantially the same now as at the time
Bishop was decided.

Justice McFadden quoted the "charging portion" of the indictment filed in Bishop as
follows:
'THAT THE SAID DEFENDANT, HOMER H. BISHOP, on or about the 27th
day of June, 1964, in Ada County, Idaho, then and there being, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, intentionally and feloniously and with the intent to defraud
Albertson's Vista Food Center, attempt to utter, publish and pass as true and
genuine to the said Albertson's Vista Food Center a certain false and fictitious
check for the payment of money in the sum of One Hundred Twenty Seven and
75/100 (127.75) Dollars, lawful money of the United States of America,
purporting to be the true and genuine check of one Stanley Jackson, which said
check was and is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:
FAMILY FOOD SERVICE, INC.
125 EAST MAIN
WEISER, IDAHO
955
6-26-1964
Pay to the Order ofFrank Allen $127 75/xx One Hundred Twenty Seven 75/100
WEISER OFFICE
FAMILY FOOD SERVICE, INC.
THE IDAHO FIRST NATIONAL BANK
WEISER, IDAHO
/s/ Stanley Jackson, President.
Whereas in truth and in fact there was no such individual as Stanley Jackson in
existence, as he, the said defendant, then and there well knew, and the said check
was false and fictitious as he, the said defendant, then and there well knew.
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Bishop, 89 Idaho at 419 (opinion of McFadden, J.). While the charging document did not,
insofar as it was quoted in the opinion, identify under which statute the charge was brought,
Justice McFadden noted, ''No question has been presented that this prosecution was under the
provisions ofl.C. § 18-3601, which has been held to include a charge of forgery by the signing
of the name of a fictitious person." Bishop, 89 Idaho at 424 (opinion of McFadden, J.). He also
noted the parties agreed on the material elements the State was required to prove under LC. § 183606:
1. An attempt to pass a fictitious check.
2. The check must purport to be that of a corporation or individual not m
existence.
3. Knowledge of the fictitious nature of the check.
4. Intention on the part of the accused to defraud.

Bishop, 89 Idaho at 425 (opinion of McFadden, J.).
The evidence elicited at trial revealed that Family Food Service, Inc., did exist, but that it
was not currently doing business at the time the check was written. Id. After the State rested,
the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the forgery charge.

Id. at 420 (opinion of

McFadden, J.). The district court denied that motion. Id.
Justice McFadden would have held the district court erred in that regard. Id. at 425-26
(opinion of McFadden, J.).

He explained that, because the evidence did not show that the

corporation was non-existent (in that it had not been formally dissolved), the State failed to prove
the elements under I.C. § 18-3606, and so, the district court should have granted the motion for a
directed verdict. Bishop, 89 Idaho at 425-26 (opinion of McFadden, J.).
The majority of the Court disagreed. Id. at 426-28 (opinion of Taylor, J.). It concluded
that I.C. § 18-3601 identifies an included offense to I.C. § 18-3606:
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So that since the amendment of section 8414, C.S., now section 17-3706, LC.A.
[now LC. § 18-3606], any and all of the acts mentioned in section 17-3706, as
well as any and all the acts mentioned in section 17-3701, LC.A. [now LC. § 183601], constitute forgery.
Bishop, 89 Idaho at 427 (opinion of Taylor, J.) (quoting State v. Allen, 53 Idaho 737, _ , 27

P.2d 482, 484 (1933)) (brackets from Bishop).

"In other words, this court has said that an

accused may be convicted of forgery by means of a fictitious check under the provisions of either
§ 18-3601 or§ 18-3606, according to the allegations and proof in that particular case." Bishop,
89 Idaho at 427 (opinion of Taylor, J.).
Additionally, the majority concluded the charging document in that case specifically
alleged the offense under both code sections:
The words 'did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, intentionally and feloniously
and with the intent to defraud Altertson's [sic] Vista Food Center, attempt to utter,
publish and pass as true and genuine* * * a certain false and fictitious check* * *
and the said check was false and fictitious as he, the said defendant, then and
there well knew,' are sufficient to charge forgery as defmed by § 18-3601.
Coupled with these allegations the other allegations of the information are
sufficient to charge forgery as defmed by§ 18-3606.
Bishop, 89 Idaho at 427 (opinion of Taylor, J.). Therefore, the majority concluded: "The fact

that there are allegations in the information alleging additional elements of forgery as defmed in
§ 18-3606 as to which the proof may be insufficient, does not warrant this court in reversing the
conviction, when, as here, the conviction is sustained by proof of conduct defined as forgery, in
§ 18-3601." Bishop 89 Idaho at 428 (opinion of Taylor, J.).
The district court's reliance on Bishop is flawed for several reasons, which will be
addressed in tum.
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1.

Applying Bishop to Mr. Kesling's case was improper because it created
constructive amendment, and thus, a fatal variance

The district court's decision to apply Bishop's rationale to find no prejudice in this was
improper in this case because it resulted in the district court affirming Mr. Kesling's conviction
based on a fatal variance. 7 (See Supp. R., p.179.) As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, a
variance occurs when a conviction is permitted on some basis other than that set forth in the
charging document. See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011) (finding a variance between
the charging documents and the jury instructions). A variance is fatal when it amounts to a
constructive amendment, and that occurs if it "alters the charging document to the extent the
defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature. " State v. Day, 154 Idaho
476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis added).
As an initial matter, there was no vanance at issue in Bishop itself because, as the
majority concluded, the charging document in that case specifically invoked LC. § 18-3601 as an
included offense to the allegations made under LC. § 18-3606. Bishop, 89 Idaho at 427 (opinion
of Taylor, J.) (finding the conviction not reversible because the charging document articulated

7

The propriety of the district court's reliance on Bishop also presumes that Bishop remains good
law. As Justice McFadden pointed out in Bishop: "No question has been presented that this
prosecution was under the provisions of LC. § 18-3601." Bishop, 89 Idaho at 424 (opinion of
McFadden, J.). Rather, it appears the parties only argued under the auspices of I.C. § 18-3606.
See id. at 425.
Because the issue under LC. § 18-3601 was not raised in the district court, nor was it
argued on appeal, the Bishop majority's decision to affirm the decision to deny the motion for a
directed verdict on that basis was not proper. See, e.g., State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho
271, 274-75 (2017) (holding that, while the State's argument on appeal might be correct, the
district court's decision could not be affirmed on that unpreserved basis). Since Bishop's
analysis is manifestly wrong and has proven over time to be unjust or unwise for the reasons
articulated in Garcia-Rodriguez and its progeny, this Court should disavow the analysis in
Bishop. See Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990); accord State v.
Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 294 (2013) (Horton, J., concurring) (pointing out it is unwise for the
Court to decide a legal point without input from the interested parties).
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facts speaking to all the elements of LC. § 18-3601, as well as articulating additional facts
specific to LC. § 18-3606); see also State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 893 (Ct. App. 1983)
(explaining the use of an included offense essentially functions as an exception to the general
prohibition against variances). However, the charging document in Mr. Kesling's was nowhere
near so broad as the charging document in Bishop.
The charging document in Bishop (quoted m full supra) alleged that the defendant
knowing passed a fictitious check for "Family Food Service, Inc." signed by "Stanley Jackson,
President" because he knew there was no such person as Stanley Jackson. Bishop, 89 Idaho at
419 (opinion of McFadden, J.). Thus, it alleged that he passed a check knowing the account was
to a non-existent person/corporation and that he passed a check knowing generally it was
fictitious. 8 Id. at 427 (opinion of Taylor, J.).
However, the charges in Mr. Kesling's case specifically invoked LC. § 18-3606, and they
expressly alleged the crimes were all committed by Mr. Kesling, "with the intent to defraud
another, make, and/or pass, and/or utter any fictitious bill, note, or check, purporting the bill,
note, or check in writing for the payment of money or property of some such bank account when
in fact, there is no such bank account in existence, knowing the same to be fictitious, to-wit:
[specific check number] from a fictitious Bluebird bank account .... " (Supp. R., pp.22-24.) As
such, the charges in Mr. Kesling's case did not have the additional language that the information
in Bishop did, to assert that he knew, generally, the check was fictitious. 9 (See generally Supp.

8

The charging document, insofar as it was quoted in the Bishop opinion, did not mention which
particular statute it was alleging had been violated. See Bishop, 89 Idaho at 419 (opinion of
McFadden, J.).
9
In fact, the evidence before the district court - that the checks were printed for Mr. Kesling at
American Express's direction after it validated Mr. Kesling's order for those checks - indicates
he knew the checks were not generally fictitious.
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R., pp.22-24.) Thus, unlike Bishop, the charges against Mr. Kesling only alleged a violation of
I.C. § 18-3606 by passing a check knowing the account was non-existent.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated, if the charging document is limited as to the
means by which the defendant is alleged to have committed the crime, then an expansion of the
nature of the offense to include other means of committing the crime constitutes a variance. See
State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 121 (2019) (explaining there was no variance in that case based

on a jury instruction which was more general as to the means because "[t]here is nothing in the
information that indicated the State's arguments about the [charged offense] would be limited'' to
a particular means) (emphasis added). This is particularly true when the prosecutor was aware of
other facts which might have supported the charge at the time the charging document was
drafted. See State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566 (Ct. App. 1993) (indicating there was actually
a fatal variance because the defendant had no notice that the State intended to seek a guilty
verdict based on other acts not articulated in the charging document when "the course of
proceedings show that the prosecutor possessed all of these facts prior to the time he charged
Colwell . . . . Yet the prosecutor opted to charge Colwell only with a single count of lewd
conduct committed by a specific act of sexual intercourse with A.C. accomplished in June,
1990").
And yet, the district court's prejudice analysis in this case did exactly what Miller and
Colwell indicated was improper. By evaluating whether Mr. Kesling was prejudiced on the

charge of forgery based on the specific conduct of writing a falsified pre-authorization code on
an otherwise-valid check instead of evaluating whether he was prejudiced on the charge of
forgery based on the alleged conduct of writing a check on a non-existent bank account as the
charging document specifically alleged, the district court constructively altered the nature of the

20

offense. Thus, the district court's use of the Bishop rationale was erroneous because it was based
on a fatal variance.
Moreover, it is important to remember that, under the applicable standard of review, the
question in this post-conviction case is not whether Mr. Kesling might have ultimately been
convicted at trial on some other included offense, but specifically whether he would have still
pleaded guilty to the charged offense. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Booth, 151 Idaho at 622. Under
that standard, Bishop is unhelpful because it is, essentially, a sufficiency of the evidence case.
As such, it does not speak directly, if at all, to the analysis in the post-conviction context about
whether counsel's failure to investigate the case before the trial prejudiced the defendant.
Because of the difference in procedural stances, the State's argument under Bishop in the
post-conviction context, which was adopted by the district court, is based on pure conjecture that trial counsel, having properly and fully investigated the case, would still have recommended
Mr. Kesling plead guilty to a charge to which he had a factual defense on the possibility the State
might subsequently invoke an alternative theory of guilt at some point later in the case. Since
there was no evidence supporting that presumption, much less evidence demonstrating there was
no genuine issue of fact in that regard when all the reasonable inferences were run in
Mr. Kesling's favor, summary dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
on Bishop's analysis was improper, especially since trying to fit this case into Bishop's analysis
introduced a fatal variance into Mr. Kesling's case.

2.

Bishop is also factually distinguishable from Mr. Kesling's case, and therefore, its
analysis is inapplicable

As noted supra, the Bishop majority's decision was based on the conclusion that the
conviction was appropriate because that conviction could properly be based on the included
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offense under LC. § 18-3601. Bishop, 89 Idaho at 427-28 (opinion of Taylor, J.). As such,

Bishop presented a fundamentally different scenario than Mr. Kesling's case, as Mr. Kesling
specifically pled guilty to the greater offense under LC. § 18-3606, not an included offense
under LC. § 18-3601. (Supp. R., p.138 (the judgment of conviction from the underlying criminal
case declaring Mr. Kesling had pled to the offense articulated in Count I, a violation of LC. § 183606).)
The district court is not required to give an included offense instruction if the parties do
not request it.

State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 787 (1997); see LC. § 19-2132(b). Thus, a

defendant may strategically choose not to request an included offense instruction in the hopes the
jury will simply acquit on the greater offense for lack of proof no all the elements of the greater
offense. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634 (1980) (acknowledging this situation is, in
fact, what the law directs the jury to do, even if the defendant might appear guilty of some other,
uncharged offense); see also Patrick D. Pflaum, Justice Is Not All Or Nothing: Preserving the

Integrity of Criminal Trials through the Statutory Abolition of the All-or-Nothing Doctrine, 73
U. Colo. L. Rev. 289, 300-01 (Winter 2002) (noting a prosecutor might decide to strategically
not request an instruction on an included offense for similar reasons).

As such, the Idaho

Supreme Court has made it clear defense counsel needs to consult with his client about the
strategy of proceeding to trial in the face of the possibility of a yet-uninvoked included offense.

See Stanfield v. State, 165 Idaho 889, 899 n.4 (2019).
In other words, there is a reasonable possibility defense counsel's advice in Mr. Kelsing's
case about the plea agreement would have changed had he conducted a sufficient investigation
and been aware of the factual defense to the greater offense even if there was the possibility that
an included offense might subsequently be, but had not yet been, brought into play. See Hill,

22

474 U.S. at 59 (noting prejudice exists if there is a possibility defense counsel's advice about the
option to plead would change).

Certainly, according to the facts alleged (Supp. R., p.8),

Mr. Kesling's state of mind would have been different ifhe had known about that factual defense
to the greater offense. See Booth, 151 Idaho at 622 (noting prejudice exists if the defendant
would have made a different decision regarding whether to plead guilty).
Since Bishop did not involve such factual considerations, it is sufficiently distinguishable
that its legal analysis is not applicable in the context of Mr. Kesling's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. As such, the district court's reliance on Bishop's analysis was improper.

3.

Even if Bishop's rationale were applicable to this case, it still would not justify
summarily dismissing Mr. Kesling's petition because there was a genuine issue of
fact as to whether Mr. Kesling had a defense to the included offense under LC. §
18-3601

As the overarching standard makes clear, the question under the prejudice prong is
whether there is a reasonable possibility the petitioner would have changed his mind about
pleading guilty, or that defense counsel's advice about pleading guilty at that time would have
changed. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Booth, 151 Idaho at 622. In this case, the evidence revealed a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Mr. Kesling had a defense to the included offense under
LC.§ 18-3601, and that means there is a reasonable possibility that trial counsel would not have
advised he not plead, or Mr. Kesling would ultimately decide not to pled guilty on the basis of
the included offense. (See Supp. R., p.8.)
Specifically, that potential defense was based on whether a false pre-authorization code
affected the negotiability of the check because, if it did not, the false pre-authorization code
would not render the check a "forgery" under LC.§ 18-3601. (Supp. R., pp.179-80.) Under the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), an instrument is evaluated by the terms on its face, and
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parol evidence is only admissible to expand or clarify an incomplete agreement. Porcello v.
Estate of Porcello, 167 Idaho 412, _ , 470 P.3d 1221, 1234 (2020). In other words, a promise

or order to pay in an instrument is not made conditional, and thus, the instrument made nonnegotiable, by "reference to another writing" within the note. LC. § 28-3-106(1). Thus, the fact
that there might have been an agreement between Mr. Kesling and American Express that
American Express would not honor the check if there was no valid pre-authorization code, and
that such an agreement was implicitly referenced in the check, that would not necessarily affect
the negotiability of the check as between Mr. Kesling and the listed payee. 10 After all, the
evidence shows there was only one signature line on the checks, and the checks were
personalized to Mr. Kesling. (See, e.g., R., p.32 (copy of the check underlying the charge to
which Mr. Kesling ultimately pied guilty).)
Even if the check itself is ambiguous in that regard, the other evidence before the district
court when it ruled on the motions for summary judgment only reinforced that there was a
genuine issue of fact in that regard. For example, the order forms which American Express sent
to Harland Clarke request the checks be prepared with only one signature line and to be
personalized for Mr. Kesling.

(E.g., Supp. R., p.198.)

That is important because, since

American Express was the party in charge of creating the checks, any unresolved ambiguity in
the language or appearance of the checks should ultimately be construed against American

10

Out of candor, Mr. Kesling acknowledges that he included the terms of his agreement with
American Express/Bluebird as part of his motion for relief from the judgment, and that
agreement does, in fact, include a term which says a check without a pre-authorization code
would not be honored by American Express. (See Supp. R., pp.256-57.) However, that evidence
was not before the district court at the time it ruled on the motion to summarily dismiss
Mr. Kesling's petition, and so, it should not be considered in evaluating the propriety of that
decision. Cf State v. Smith, 162 Idaho 878, 885 n.6 (Ct. App. 2017) ("[I]t would be improper to
consider these facts on appeal as they were not presented to the district court at the time the
motion to suppress was being considered.").
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Express. See, e.g., Kunz v. Neild, Inc., 162 Idaho 432, 442 (2017). Additionally, the evidence
indicates that American Express has waived unauthorized check fees in Mr. Kesling's case in the
past. (Supp. R., p.117 n.1; R., p.88.) In fact, the initial report to the officer expressly noted that
two of the checks written by Mr. Kesling had actually been paid out.

(Supp. R., p.25.) If

American Express had, in fact, honored Mr. Kesling's checks without a valid pre-authorization
code, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether, by entering a false pre-authorization code,
Mr. Kesling actually intended to defraud the payee by passing the check without a valid preauthorization code.
Either way, running all the inferences in Mr. Kesling's favor, as the applicable standard
requires, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the pre-authorization code was required
(along the lines of a co-signature), or whether it was merely an additional assurance to the payee.
(See Supp. R., pp.179-80.) As such, there was this genuine issue of fact as to whether the false

pre-authorization code actually affected the negotiability of the check, and thus, rendered the
check a forgery under LC. § 18-3601. As such, there is a genuine issue of fact with respect to
whether there was a reasonable possibility Mr. Kesling would not have pled guilty, had defense
counsel conducted a sufficient investigation of this case. Therefore, summary dismissal based on
the potential included offense under Bishop's rationale was improper.

4.

Apart from its improper analysis under Bishop, the only other basis the district
court gave for its conclusion on the prejudice prong was directly contrary to Idaho
Supreme Court precedent

The only other basis besides Bishop which the district court mentioned for its
determination on the prejudice prong was that the plea agreement resulted in five of the six
charges against Mr. Kesling being dismissed. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court has made
clear, that is not a relevant consideration under the applicable standard:

25

"the fact that [the

petitioner] may have benefited by pleading guilty instead of going to trial is not relevant to
whether he was prejudiced by [trial counsel's] deficient performance." Booth, 151 Idaho at
622 n.9 (emphasis added). The reason that is the case is because:
[t]hose who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain
obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is
wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because ultimately, the
challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a
collateral challenge to conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar
downside potential.

Id. (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2010)). As such, the district court's
consideration of the fact that Mr. Kesling benefited from the plea agreement's dismissal of those
other charges was wholly improper under the controlling precedent.
The propriety of Booth and Padilla's rule in this regard is actually particularly evident in
Mr. Kesling's case. Since all six charges in this case made the same expressly-limited allegation
- that Mr. Kesling wrote checks on a bank account knowing the bank account did not exist
(Supp. R., pp.22-24) - and since a sufficient investigation would have revealed that the bank
account did exist and Mr. Kesling had valid checking privileges on it, a sufficient investigation
would have revealed a factual defense to all six alleged offenses. As such, the fact that the plea
agreement offered the dismissal of five of those charges does not make it more likely that he still
would have accepted that plea agreement. Rather, it is eminently reasonable that, armed with
that factual defense to all six charges, Mr. Kesling would have gone to trial to seek an acquittal
on all six charges. Thus, there is at least a genuine issue of fact in that regard, and so, summary
dismissal on that basis is improper.
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject the district court's
prejudice analysis.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Kesling respectfully requests this Court vacate the final judgment in this case,
reverse the order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction, and remand this case for
an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 21 st day of December, 2020.
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